

and President George Washington, who set numerous important precedents that today's military carries forward as norms of civil-military relations. Schake recounts Washington's scrupulousness in honoring Congress's role in both strategy and managing the purse strings, even when he disagreed with its decisions or lamented the slowness with which it operated. Washington's willingness to step away from his leadership roles was also remarkable at the time, impressing onlookers including King George III.

Schake's admiration for Washington is based on his political acumen, not his apoliticism. Understanding the politics of the moment (and perhaps the future), Washington made deliberate decisions to strengthen certain institutions over others, clarifying the subordination of the military to civilian authority and signaling to the public the importance of adherence to the Constitution. It was Washington, not Huntington, who laid out the tenets of American military professionalism.

Though the foundation for the stability of the U.S. civil-military relationship originated with Washington, it took time for these norms to take root. Here, *The State and the Soldier* makes a significant contribution by exploring the numerous often-overlooked instances of general officers challenging elected political authority within the first 100 years of U.S. history, including insubordination from future Presidents such as Ulysses S. Grant and Zachary Taylor. Even so, the staying power of the norms established during Washington's tenure carried through the tough early years to serve as the better example from early U.S. history.

The most dangerous event in U.S. civil-military history might have been the failed conspiracy of former Vice President Aaron Burr and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, James Wilkinson. However, Schake believes the most trying moment was when Congress compelled General Ulysses Grant to testify against the President and the Secretary of War. In December 1867, the House was considering President Andrew Johnson's impeachment, posing tough questions to Grant about the President's policies. Although Grant had a checkered

history regarding civil-military relations, in this critical moment he followed in Washington's footsteps by siding with Congress in its Constitutional oversight role, regardless of the effect on the military and commander-in-chief.


According to Schake, two major efforts contributed to a transformation in civil-military relations: the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 and the professionalization of the military around the turn of the century, following the example of the Prussian school. The result was a military that invested in its own technical competence and ethos, designed for employment primarily overseas. Schake is just as meticulous about retelling the history of civil-military relations in the United States after these first 100 years, through the modern era and until today, including an entire chapter devoted to the past decade, but notes that these events pale in comparison to the potential threats posed in the early years.

Despite the professionalization of the military that inculcated many of the norms Washington pioneered, the civil-military relationship today is far from perfect. Using historical cases, Schake performs some course-correction on prevailing narratives regarding more recent events in civil-military relations. She provides examples of general officers staying above the political fray and mistakes that general officers have made in attempting to constructively engage in inherently political conversations. Ultimately, it is the civilian leadership's responsibility to make and own strategic decisions. For example, while H.R. McMaster wrote that military officers were derelict in their duty to push back on bad civilian strategy during the Vietnam War, Schake questions whether his preferred approach would be appropriate as civil-military relations advice.

Instead of outright defiance, the civil-military relationship in the modern era has been mostly characterized by Feaver's concept of "shirking"—that is, military leadership's placing bureaucratic obstacles in the way of implementation of civilian political decisions. While military professionals are taught to remain "apolitical," adept bureaucratic maneuvering is often lauded as an important skill set for senior

officers. Military leaders are often called on to navigate political worlds, requiring a more sophisticated understanding of the history and context in which military professionals are operating today. *The State and the Soldier* is essential reading for any military professional who anticipates an assignment in the National Capital Region or other strategic-level commands requiring engagement with senior civilian leadership. JFQ

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Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence

By Amy B. Zegart
Princeton University Press, 2022
424 pp., \$21.95 (Paperback)
ISBN-13: 978-0691223070
Reviewed by Nalonic J.M. Tyrrell

Amy Zegart has long been intrigued—and often confounded—by America's obsession with what she calls "spytainment": the blending of espionage and enter-

tainment. A respected political scientist, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and courtesy professor at Stanford University, Zegart is well-positioned to critique both the myth and the reality of intelligence work. She observed that following the events of September 11th, public interest in intelligence surged, yet this did not translate into a deeper understanding of the field's realities.

Her latest book, *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence*, serves as both a primer and a provocation. Zegart attempts to bridge the gap between public fascination and professional understanding, writing for policymakers, students, and lay readers alike. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the American intelligence community, addressing core topics such as intelligence definitions, historical development, covert operations, counterintelligence, congressional oversight, and the rapidly evolving realm of open-source intelligence. Although Zegart intentionally omits some details to maintain accessibility, the book succeeds in tackling areas where public misunderstanding is most pervasive.

After establishing foundational knowledge, Zegart turns to critique. She argues that American intelligence agencies are “woefully unprepared to face the challenges of the twenty-first century” and warns that they “must either adapt or fail.” Her concerns stem from four primary challenges: empowered adversaries, overwhelming data volumes, the erosion of secrecy as a result of technological diffusion, and insufficient collaboration with innovation hubs such as Silicon Valley. Zegart identifies the last factor as a strategic disadvantage—unlike their U.S. counterparts, the intelligence services of our adversaries are more agile and integrated with their countries' respective tech sectors.

In addition to external threats, Zegart highlights internal cognitive vulnerabilities. She dedicates a compelling discussion to cognitive biases, referring to them as “cognitive traps that can lead even the sharpest minds astray.” While such biases are a universal human tendency, the intelligence community's

insular and secretive nature magnifies their consequences. The absence of transparency and limited external scrutiny often elevate flawed assessments to unquestioned truths, exacerbating the risk of error. Zegart argues that genuine reform must go beyond operational secrecy and embrace a new paradigm—one that values openness, especially in leveraging open-source intelligence.

For students at professional military education institutions, *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms* is more than just an introduction to the intelligence community—it is a strategic warning. Zegart's emphasis on the challenges of cognitive bias, technological disruption, and adversaries' willingness to innovate has direct relevance for the joint force. Future planners and operators must be able to critically assess intelligence, understand its inherent limitations, and integrate open-source information with traditional methods. In an era of strategic competition where misinformation and data saturation are weapons, Zegart's insights equip our students not only to consume intelligence but also to question its foundations and adapt it for operational decision-making.

Her warning becomes even more urgent in light of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in the national security sphere. As professionals grow increasingly reliant on AI tools—despite well-known limitations such as algorithmic bias and hallucination—the potential for flawed intelligence estimates with real-world consequences becomes acute. Zegart's analysis implicitly calls for a recalibration of how technological tools are assessed and integrated into intelligence workflows.

What distinguishes *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms* is Zegart's dual perspective: she combines the analytical clarity of a policy scholar with the sensitivity of someone closely attuned to the human dilemmas of intelligence work. Through interviews and real-world case studies, she captures not only the systemic challenges but also the ethical and personal struggles faced by intelligence professionals. The result is a book that balances academic insight with narrative accessibility.

Whether one is a national security professional, a student of intelligence, or simply a curious citizen captivated by espionage thrillers, *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms* offers a lucid and timely exploration of a field undergoing tectonic change. Zegart makes a persuasive case: understanding intelligence today requires moving beyond the shadows and into the algorithms. Her book is essential reading. **JFQ**

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